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A quantitative approach to semantic informativity
Anderson de Arau´jo
Abstract This article shows a form of measuring semantic informativity of de-
ductions. Dynamic concepts of complexity and relevancy are presented according
to explicit definitions of insertion and deletion on databases. Hence, with respect
to finite databases, it solves Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox and Hintikka’ scandal of
deduction.
1 Introduction
It seems plausible to believe we can get new information by reasoning deductively.
Concerning this subject, Aristotle said that “every belief comes either through syl-
logism or from induction” ([Aristotle(1989)], Book 2, Part 23). There is, however,
a problem with that basic belief about informativity of deductions:
1. A deduction φ0,φ1 . . . ,φn is valid if, and only if, the conjunction of its pre-
misses, says φ0, . . . ,φk, implies its conclusion, φn.
2. In this case, its associated conditional (φ0∧·· ·∧φk)→ φn is a tautology.
3. Tautologies are propositions without information.
4. Therefore, deductions are uninformative.
Hintikka called this problem scandal of deduction [Hintikka(1970)]. It is a
scandal, not merely because it contradicts Aristotle’s maxim that deductions are
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important for obtaining beliefs, but, mainly, in virtue of the fact that we actually
get information via deductions. In what sense, then, does deductive reasoning give
us new information?
For Bar-Hillel-Carnap’s classical theory of semantic information
[Bar-Hillel and Carnap(1963)], the information associated to deductions is
semantic, it is an information about the meaning of propositions. To be precise,
Bar-Hillel-Carnap’s theory was designed to measure the amount of semantic
information of propositions, not deductions, but, considering the associated con-
ditionals of deductions, it can be extended to deductions too. Bar-Hillel-Carnap’s
theory is a complement of Shannon’s theory of communication [Shannon(1948)],
which treats syntactic information, and so it relies on probability theory - indeed
on Carnap’s inductive logic. For this reason, it has a very counter-intuitive
consequence, namely, contradictions have infinite semantic information, whereas
tautologies have null information. Floridi refers this undesirable consequence
as the Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox ([Floridi(2004)]). Because tautologies have
null information in Bar-Hillel-Carnap’s theory, the scandal of deduction has no
solution in it.
Hintikka [Hintikka(1970)] displayed a theory of surface information and
depth information of propositions, to solve the scandal of deduction in polyadic
first-order languages. Analyzing the associated conditional of deductions, Hin-
tikka’s theory provided an undecidable measure of semantic informativity that
is unpractical (Cf. [Sequoiah-Grayson(2008)] for details). To overcome that, in
[D’Agostino and Floridi(2009)] D’Agostino and Floridi tried to establish a prac-
tical distinction between informative and uninformative deductions, using no-
tions from computational complexity. D’Agostino-Floridi’s work relies, in turn, on
Floridi’s theory of strong semantic information (Cf. [Floridi(2011)]). According to
Floridi’ strong theory, semantic information is true well-formed data. From this
standpoint and using situation logic, he was able to explain in [Floridi(2004)] why
some propositions are more informative than others, and so a solution to Bar-Hillel-
Carnap paradox was given, but not to Hintikka’s scandal of deduction. This the
reason for D’Agostino-Floridi latter work [D’Agostino and Floridi(2009)], which
focused on propositional logic. Nonetheless, D’Agostino-Floridi’s approach is, in
principle, limited, because their approach can be applied, at best, to monadic first-
order languages, in virtue of the restriction of computational complexity to decid-
able sets.
The aim of this paper is to extend Floridi’s original strong perspective to general
first-order deductions, without assuming truth as part of the definiens of semantic
information. This may seem paradoxical, but we will show that it is not. Let us
sketch an explanation for that.
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We will study deductions into a direct semantic way. This means two things.
First, deductions will be analyzed inmselves, and not by their associated condition-
als. Second, deductions will be studied in terms of the structures that interpret them,
which are called databases (Cf. [Kroenke and Auer(2007)]). As databases are finite
structures and there is, in general, no complete deductive first-order logical system
for finite structures (Cf. [Ebbinghaus and Flum(1999)]), our semantic approach to
deductions is technically well-justified. Indeed, due to the incompleteness of first-
order logic for databases, syntactic approaches will be necessarily incomplete. This
is our methodological strategy.
In reference to conceptual strategy, we propose to measure the degree of se-
mantic informativity of deductions as a dynamic phenomenon, based on explicit
definitions of insertions and deletions on databases (Section 2). As databases may
not correspond to reality, this is the sense in which we do not assume truth as
part of the definiens of semantic information. More precisely, we do not use the
concept of truth as correspondence in order to define semantic informativity (Cf.
[Kirkham(1992)]). There is, even so, a sense in which truth is part of semantic in-
formation. Given the explicit definitions of structural operations, we will delimit a
dynamic concept of informational complexity (Section 3), on the one hand, and a
dynamic concept of informational relevancy (Section 4), on the other. Hence, se-
mantic informativity will be conceived in terms of complexity and relevancy, which
relies on the Tarskian conception of truth [Tarski(1983)].
In other words, we sustain that truth is a constituent of semantic information,
but it is a presupposition for informativity, not part of the definition of semantic
information. In our approach false propositions can be semantically informative.
We measure, however, the semantic informativity of propositions looking for what
is sufficient to become them true. More accurately, we can say that semantic infor-
mativity is the product of two factors: how many structural operations we do for
propositions to become true with respect to our database and how many of these
propositions are relevant. As consequence of this approach, with respect to finite
databases, we will exhibit a unified solution to Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox and Hin-
tikka’s scandal of deduction (Section 5).
2 Structural operations
According to [Floridi(2011)], semantic information is true well-formed data.
We intend to analyze the semantic information of deductions. Since deduc-
tions are compounded of propositions, we can assume that data is expressed
into propositions. Databases are, in turn, organized collections of data (Cf.
[Kroenke and Auer(2007)]). Thus we can conceive that the semantic information
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of deductions is represented into databases. From a logical point of view, the con-
cept of database could be understood by means of the concept of mathematical
structure.
Remark 21 We write A(φ) = 1 to indicate that proposition φ is true in structure
A.
Definition 21 Let S be a signature. An S-database is a pair D = (A,T ) com-
pounded of a finite first-order structure A over S and a correct finite classical
first-order theory T over S and about A. The theory T is correct about A in the
sense that A(φ) = 1 for all φ ∈ T.
Remark 22 We use pαq = β to express that the symbol β is a formal represen-
tation of the expression α . Besides, Xβ is the interpretation of β in the structure
A, where X is a set over the domain of A. The domain of A will be represented by
dom(A), and individuals of dom(A) are represented by a bar above letters.
Example 21 Let D0 = (A0,T ) be a database with signature S =
({s, l,a},{C,E,H}), for s = pSa˜o Pauloq, l = pLondonq, a = pAvenida Paulistaq,
C = pCityq, E = pStreetq and H = pTo haveq, such that A0 =
({s¯, ¯l, a¯}, s¯s, ¯ll , a¯a,{s¯, ¯l}C,{a¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(¯l, a¯)}H) and T = {∀x(Cx →
∃yHxy),∀x(Cx∨Ex),¬El,Cs}.
The example 21 indicates some features of the approach that we intend to de-
velop here. The fact that T is correct with respect to A does not exclude the non-
correspondence of our database to reality. For instance, it is true in A that Hla∧Ea,
in words, it is true in A that London has a city called Avenida Paulista, what is false
until the date of this paper. The theory T represents the fundamental facts of our
database that we consider true, that is to say, T has our fundamental beliefs. It is
important to note that T may not be complete about A, i.e., it is possible that not all
true propositions about A are in T ; example 21 shows this.
To measure semantic informativity of deductions, we define a dynamic of
changes in databases through operations called structural operations. The first one
consists of introducing possibly new objects into the structure of the database and
interpreting the possibly new symbols with these objects.
Remark 23 We presume that constants are the unique symbols of ariety 0 and that
relational and functional symbols have ariety greater than 0.
Definition 22 Let D = (A,T ) be an S-database. An insertion of an n-ary symbol σ
into D is a database D′ = (A,T ) such that A′ is a structure over S′ = S∪{σ} with
the following properties:
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1. A′(τ) = A(τ) for all τ 6= σ such that τ ∈ S;
2. If n = 0 and σ ∈ S, then dom(A′) = dom(A) and A′(σ) = A(σ), but if n = 0
and σ /∈ S, then dom(A′) = dom(A)∪{a} and A′(σ) = a, provided A′(φ) = 1
for all φ ∈ T ;
3. If n > 0, then dom(A′) = dom(A) ∪ {a1, . . . ,an} and A′(σ) = A(σ) ∪
{(a1, . . . ,an)}, provided A′(φ) = 1 for all φ ∈ T .
Example 22 Let D0 = (A,T ) be the database in example 21. The database
D1 = (A1,T ) with signature S′ = S ∪ {b}, where b = pShaftesbury Avenueq,
and A1 = ({s¯, ¯l, a¯}, s¯s, ¯ll , a¯a, a¯b,{s¯, ¯l}C,{a¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(¯l, a¯)}H) is an in-
sertion of b into D. On the other hand, given the S′-structure A2 =
({s¯, ¯l, a¯, ¯b}, s¯s, ¯ll , a¯a, a¯b,{s¯, ¯l}C,{a¯, ¯b}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(¯l, a¯)}H), D2 = (A2,T ) is
an insertion of E into D1. Nonetheless, considering the S′-structure
A∗ = ({s¯, ¯l, a¯, ¯b}, s¯s, ¯ll , a¯a, ¯bb,{s¯, ¯l}C,{a¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(¯l, a¯)}H), we have that
D∗ = (A∗,T ) is not an insertion of b into D1 because A∗(∀x(Cx∨Ex)) = 0.
The example 22 shows that it is not necessary the introduction of a new object
into the structure of the database in order to define an insertion (Cf. database D1). It
is sufficient to add an element in interpretation of some symbol. On the other hand,
this example also exhibits that the introduction of a new object into the structure
of the database does not necessarily produce an insertion (Cf. database D∗). It is
necessary to guarantee that the fundamental beliefs of the database are true in the
new structure.
We turn now to the second structural operation. This operation consists of re-
moving possibly old objects from the structure of the database and interpreting the
possibly new symbols with the remain objects.
Definition 23 Let A be an S-structure. An element a∈ dom(A) is called free for the
symbol σ ∈ S if there is no constant τ ∈ S such that τ 6= σ and A(τ) = a or symbol
δ with arity n > 0 such that (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ A(δ ) and a = bi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
If σ is an n-ary symbol, we write A(σ)i to denote element ai of some sequence
(a1, . . . ,an) ∈ A(σ).
Definition 24 Let D = (A,T ) be an S-database. A deletion of an n-ary symbol σ
from D is a database D′ = (A′,T ) such that A′ is a structure over S′, where either
S′ = S or S′ = S−{σ}, with the following properties:
1. A′(τ) = A(τ) for all τ 6= σ such that τ ∈ S−{σ};
2. If n = 0 and S′ = S, then dom(A′) = dom(A) and A′(σ) = a for some a ∈
dom(A) such that a 6= A(σ), but if n = 0 and S′ = S−{σ}, then dom(A′) =
dom(A)−{A(σ)} if A(σ) is free for σ , otherwise, dom(A′) = dom(A), in any
case provided A′(φ) = 1 for all φ ∈ T ;
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3. If n > 0 and S′ = S, then dom(A′) = dom(A) and A′(σ) = A(σ) −
{(a1, . . . ,an)}, but if n > 0 and S′ = S − {σ}, then dom(A′) = dom(A)−
{A(σ)1, . . . ,A(σ)k}, where each A(σ)i is free for σ and , in any case provided
A′(φ) = 1 for all φ ∈ T.
Example 23 Let D0 = (A,T ) be the database in example 21. The database D′1 =
(A′1,T ) with signature S and A′1 = ({s¯, ¯l, a¯}, a¯s, ¯ll , a¯a,{s¯, ¯l}C,{a¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(¯l, a¯)}H)
is a deletion of s from D. On the other hand, D′2 = (A′2,T ) is a deletion of H
from D′1 where A′2 = ({s¯, ¯l, a¯}, a¯s, ¯ll , a¯a,{s¯, ¯l}C,{a¯}E ,{(¯l, a¯)}H) is an S-structure.
Nonetheless, for A′3 = ({ ¯l, a¯}, a¯s, ¯ll , a¯a,{ ¯l}C,{a¯}E ,{(¯l, a¯)}H), a structure over the
signature S, we have that D′3 = (A3,T ) is not a deletion of C from D′1 because in
this case, in despite of A′3(φ) = 1 for φ ∈ T , D′3(H) 6= D′1(H). Note, however, that
D′3 is a deletion of C from D′2.
The example 23 illustrates other important aspects of databases. First, each
structural operation can change the interpretation of one, and only one, symbol.
For this reason D′3 is not a deletion of C from D′1, but D′3 is a deletion of C from
D′2. Second, we can only delete the elements of the symbol’s interpretation to be
deleted, without interfering into the interpretations of the others. The restriction to
free objects ensures that.
Insertions and deletions on databases are well-known primitive opera-
tions in the study of databases and dynamic computational complexity (Cf.
[Kroenke and Auer(2007)], [Weber and Schwentick(2007)]). Nevertheless, to the
best of our knowledge, they have being conceived as undefined notions. In con-
trast, we presented a logical conception about databases with explicit definitions
of insertion and deletion. These definitions will permit us to develop a quantitative
approach to semantic informativity in the next sections.
3 Informational complexity
For Popper, “the amount of empirical information conveyed by a theory, or its em-
pirical content, increases with its degree of falsifiability” [Popper(1959)][pg.96].
Thus, by duality we can infer that the empirical information of a theory decreases
with its degree of verifiability. It is well-known that Popper does not assign mean-
ing to the notion of degree of verifiability, but in the context of our approach we
can do that. Indeed, the number of structural operations performed on our database
D = (A,T ) to produce a database D = (B,T ) in which φ is true can be viewed as
the degree of verifiability of φ . In this case, the more structural operations φ re-
quires to become true the less verifiable φ is. In what follows we provide a precise
meaning to that perspective.
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Definition 31 An update of an S-database D is an at most enumerable sequence
D = (Di : i < α) such that D0 = D and each Di+1 is an insertion or deletion in
Di. An update D = (Di : i < α) of D is satisfactory for a proposition φ if α =
n+ 1, for some n ∈ N, Dn+1 = (An,T ) and An(φ) = 1; otherwise, D is said to be
unsatisfactory for φ . We write D(φ) = 1 or D(φ) = 0 according to D is satisfactory
for φ or not. A proposition φ is D-acceptable if there is an update of D satisfactory
for φ , otherwise, φ is called D-unacceptable. Besides that, if D = (Di : i < n), with
Di = (Ai,T ), and D(φ) = 1, we define ‖D‖= min{i < n : Ai(φ) = 1}.
Example 31 Let D0 be the database in example 21 and D1 in example 22. The
sequence D = (D0,D1) is an update of D satisfactory for Eb and Hlb. Consider
the databases D′1, D′2 and D′3 in example 23. The sequence D ′ = (D0,D′1,D′2,D′3)
is an update of D satisfactory for Es∧¬Hsa but not for s = a because the last
proposition is false in A′3 = ({ ¯l, a¯}, a¯s, ¯ll , a¯a,{ ¯l}C,{a¯}E ,{(¯l, a¯)}H).
In other words, an update satisfactory for a proposition φ is a sequence of
changes made on our database D to produce a structure B in which φ is true. This
number of chances measures a certain complexity of φ and its degree of verifiabil-
ity is inverse to that complexity. For the sake of generality, in the definition below
we formalize this notion of complexity with respect to sets of updates (the case of
one update is so a particular sub-case).
Definition 32 Let D be a database and let ¯D be a collection of updates over D.
The informational complexity of φ in ¯D is defined by
C
¯D
(φ) = min
D∈ ¯D
{‖D‖ : D(φ) = 1},
if there is D ∈ ¯D satisfactory for φ , otherwise, we define that
C
¯D
(φ) = 0.
Example 32 Let ¯D = {D}, where D is the update in example 31. Since D is
satisfactory for Eb and Hlb, we have C
¯D
(Eb) = C
¯D
(Hlb) = 1 and so C
¯D
(Eb∧
Hlb) = C
¯D
(Eb∨Hlb) = 1. Now, let ¯D ′ = {D ′}, where D ′ is the update in ex-
ample 31. Then, we have C
¯D ′(¬Cs) = 1, C ¯D ′(¬Hsa) = 3, C ¯D ′(s = a) = 0 and so
C
¯D ′(¬Cs∧¬Hsa) = 3 but C ¯D ′(¬Cs∧ s = a) = 0.
The example 32 exhibits that, given an update, different propositions can have
different complexities, but different propositions can have same complexity too.
In special, an intriguing point deserves attention. It seems natural to think that
Eb∧Hlb is in some sense more complex than Eb and Hlb. Here we do not have this
phenomenon. Since C
¯D
(Eb) = C
¯D
(Hlb) = C
¯D
(Eb∧Hlb) = C
¯D
(Eb∨Hlb) = 1,
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informational complexity is not an additive measure of complexity of propositions.
That is to say, informational complexity of conjunctions or disjunctions is not the
sum of their components. Another interesting point is that C
¯D ′(¬Hsa)>C ¯D ′(¬Cs)
but C
¯D ′(¬Hsa) = C ¯D(¬Cs∧Hlb) = 3. This reflects the fact that updates are se-
quences. First, we took ¬Cs and made it D-acceptable, later we made ¬Hsa an
D-acceptable proposition. When ¬Hsa is D-satisfactory there is nothing more to
be done, as far as the conjunction ¬Cs∧¬Hsa is concerned1.
We can now define the informational complexity of sets of propositions with
respect to a given set of updates over a database.
Definition 33 Let D be a database and let ¯D be a collection of updates over D.
The informational complexity of a set of formulas {φ0, . . . ,φn} in ¯D is defined by
C
¯D
({φ0, . . . ,φn}) =
n
∑
i=0
C
¯D
(φi).
We define the informational complexity of a deduction φ0, . . . ,φn as the infor-
mational complexity of the set {φ0, . . . ,φn}.
From these definitions we get an important result for our analysis of Bar-Hillel-
Carnap paradox and Hintikka’s scandal of deduction.
Lemma 31 For every collection of updates ¯D over an S-database D, the following
statements are true:
1. If φ is a tautology over S and ¯D is not empty, then C
¯D
(φ) = 0.
2. If φ is a tautology with symbols not in S and ¯D has some satisfactory update
for φ , then C
¯D
(φ)> 0.
3. if φ is D-unacceptable, then C
¯D
(φ) = 0.
Proof Let D = (A,T ) be an S-database. If ¯D is not empty, it is immediate from the
definition of C
¯D
(φ) that C
¯D
(φ) = 0 for φ a tautology over S, because A(φ) = 1 and
every update D = (Di : i < α) over D is such that D0 = (A,T ).
Suppose that φ is a tautology not over S. Let ¯D be a collection of updates over
D with one satisfactory update for φ . Then, there are symbols in φ that are not in
S, say that these symbols are σ0, . . . ,σk. In this case, every structure B such that
B  ψ should be a structure over a signature S′ ⊇ S∪{σ0, . . . ,σk}. This means that
B has interpretations that A does not have, namely B(σ0), . . . ,B(σk). Therefore,
every update D = (D0, . . . ,Dn) in ¯D satisfactory for φ is such that D0 = D and
Dn = (B,T ) should have n > k, for it is necessary at least one structural operation
to define each B(σi). This shows that 0 <C ¯D(φ).
1 In a future work, we will analyze these characteristics of the notion of complexity in details.
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If φ is D-unacceptable, there is no update D = (D0, . . . ,Dn) of D satisfactory
for φ . This means that C
¯D
(φ) = 0 for every collection of updates ¯D over D.
We have defined C
¯D
(φ) in such a way that, in principle, if φ was a tautology
or contradiction, then C
¯D
(φ) = 0. Nonetheless, lemma 31 shows that, from an
informational point of view, there is a natural asymmetry between tautologies and
contradictions. Tautologies could be complex in some situations, notably, when
they have new symbols (relatively to a given database). In contrast, contradictions
always have null informational complexity.
4 Informational relevancy
The fundamental distinction between a set of propositions and a deduction is that in
a deduction there is a necessary connection among its propositions and one special
proposition called conclusion (Cf. [Shapiro(2005)]). In the process of obtaining
an update satisfactory for the conclusion of a deduction, some propositions may be
relevant with respect to our beliefs, but others not. The informativity of a deduction
depends on the relevance we associated to its propositions. For this reason, in what
follows we will define a logical notion of relevance.
Definition 41 Let D be an update of a database D = (A,T ). The informational
relevant propositions of a set of formulas {φ0, . . . ,φn} are those for which D is
satisfactory but that are not logical consequences of T , i.e., the propositions in the
set
D({φ0, . . . ,φn}) = {φ ∈ {φ0, . . . ,φn} : D(φ) = 1 and T 2 φ}.
From now on we will omit the parentheses in D({φ0, . . . ,φn}).
Example 41 For D = (D0), where D0 is the database in example 31, we have
D(Ea,∃xEx)= {Ea}. Let D ′=(D0,D1), where D0 and D1 are the databases in ex-
ample 31 too. In this case, D ′(∀x(Cx →¬Ex),Cb,Cb →¬Eb,¬Eb) = {∀x(Cx →
¬Ex),Cb →¬Eb}.
In definition 41 we have opted by a strong requirement about relevancy of
propositions, namely, only the non-logical consequences of our fundamental be-
lieves are relevant. For practical purposes, this requirement could be relaxed. Here
we are interested in foundational problems, Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox and Hin-
tikka’s scandal of deduction. In this case definition 41 seems to be a good begin-
ning, but there is a sense in which it is too much weak for analyzing information
of deductions.
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Proposition 41 For every update D of D and valid deduction φ0, . . . ,φn, if D is
unsatisfactory for φ , then some premisses of φ0, . . . ,φn are not informational rele-
vant.
Proof Suppose that Γ = {φ0, . . . ,φk} are the premisses of φ0, . . . ,φn, and consider
an update D of D unsatisfactory for its conclusion φn. If φ0, . . . ,φn is a valid deduc-
tion, then, for every A, if A(φ) = 1 for every φ ∈Γ , then A(φn) = 1. As D(φn) = 0,
it follows that D(φ) = 0 for some φ ∈ Γ . Hence, D(Γ )< |Γ |, where |Γ | indicates
the cardinality of Γ .
Hence, if we analyze which propositions of a valid deduction are relevant in
an update unsatisfactory for its conclusion, we will establish a priori that some
premiss is irrelevant for the deduction. In other words, we loose the possible infor-
mation associated to the connection between the conclusion and some premiss of
the deduction under analysis. This is untenable. We should, then, analyze the rele-
vancy of deductions with respect to updates satisfactory for conclusions. Moreover,
if φ0, . . . ,φn is an invalid deduction, then there is always an update D unsatisfactory
for its conclusion φn, and so invalid deductions are not informative, for they do not
guarantee any intrinsic relationship among conclusion and premisses.
Let us refine a little more the remark above. Given a deduction φ0,φ1, . . . ,φn
compounded of propositions over a signature S, we assume that its premisses are
the first propositions φ0,φ1, . . . ,φk (k ≤ n) and the conclusion is the last one φn. We
call this set the support of φ0,φ1, . . . ,φn, that is to say, the support of a deduction
is its set of premisses plus its conclusion, in symbols {φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn}. Now sup-
pose that we have a valid deduction φ0,φ1, . . . ,φn with support {φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn}.
Then, as φ0,φ1, . . . ,φn is valid, D(φi) = 1, 0 ≤ i ≤ k, implies that D(φ j) = 1,
k ≤ j ≤ n, for every update D . Hence, although the steps from the premisses to
the conclusion of φ0,φ1, . . . ,φn may be relevant from a syntactical standpoint, from
a semantic perspective we can only pay attention to the relationship among pre-
misses of φ0,φ1, . . . ,φn and its conclusion, that is to say, we can just look at the
support {φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn}.
Definition 42 Let D be a database, ¯D a collection of updates over D and
φ0, . . . ,φn a deduction with support {φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn}. If φ0, . . . ,φn is valid, then
the informational relevancy of φ0, . . . ,φn in ¯D is defined by
R
¯D
(φ0, . . . ,φn) = |D({φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn})|
|{φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn}| ,
where D is the smallest update in ¯D satisfactory for φn, but if there is no such
a D or φ0, . . . ,φn is invalid, then we define that
R
¯D
(φ0, . . . ,φn) = 0.
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Example 42 Let ¯D = {D ,D ′}, where D and D ′ are the updates in example 41.
Hence, R
¯D
(Ea,∃xEx) = 1, but R
¯D
(∀x(Cx →¬Ex),Cb,Cb →¬Eb,¬Eb) = 0 be-
cause there is no update in ¯D satisfactory for ¬Eb. Nonetheless, consider the
new update D ′′ = (D0,D1,D2,D3,D4) such that D0, D1 and D2 are the up-
dates in example 22, A3 = ({s¯, ¯l, a¯, ¯b}, s¯s, ¯ll , a¯a, ¯bb,{s¯, ¯l}C,{a¯, ¯b}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(¯l, a¯)}H)
and A4 = ({s¯, ¯l, a¯, ¯b}, s¯s, ¯ll , a¯a, ¯bb,{s¯, ¯l}C,{a¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(¯l, a¯)}H). Now, put ¯D ′ =
{D ,D ′,D ′′}. In this case, we have that R
¯D ′(∀x(Cx → ¬Ex),Cb,Cb →
¬Eb,¬Eb) = 2/3 because D ′′({∀x(Cx → ¬Ex),Cb}{¬Eb}) = {∀x(Cx →
¬Ex),¬Eb}.
In example 42 the fact that R
¯D
(∀x(Cx→¬Ex),Cb,Cb→¬Eb,¬Eb) = 0 show
us that we can have valid deductions with new symbols but irrelevant. On the other
hand, R
¯D
(Ea,∃xEx) = 1 shows that it is not necessary to consider new symbols to
find deductions with non-null relevancy. This means that informational relevancy
has a criteria of nullity different from informational complexity.
Lemma 41 For every set of updates ¯D over an S-database D=(A,T ), if φ0, . . . ,φn
is a deduction with support {φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn}, then R ¯D(φ0, . . . ,φn) = 0 in the fol-
lowing cases:
1. T is a complete theory of A and φ0, . . . ,φn is an S-deduction;
2. φn is a tautology and {φ0, . . . ,φk}=⊘;
3. φn is D-unacceptable.
Proof Let φ0, . . . ,φn be a deduction with support {φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn}. If φ0, . . . ,φn is
invalid, then, by definition, R
¯D
(φ0, . . . ,φn) = 0 for every ¯D . Besides that, if ¯D is
empty, by definition R
¯D
(φ0, . . . ,φn) = 0. Then, let us consider that φ0, . . . ,φn is
valid and ¯D is not empty.
Suppose that T is a complete theory of A and φ0, . . . ,φn is an S-deduction.
Then, for every φ ∈ {φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn}, if B is an S-structure that is a model of T and
B(φ) = 1, then T  φ . By definition, every update of D is compounded of models
of T . Thus, if D = (D0, . . . ,Dm) is an update of D and Am(φ) = 1, then T  φ and
so φ is not relevant, but if Am(φ) = 0, then φ is not relevant too. Therefore, if T is
a complete theory of A and φ0, . . . ,φn is an S-deduction, then R ¯D(φ0, . . . ,φn) = 0
for every set of updates ¯D over the S-database D = (A,T ).
Suppose φn is a tautology and {φ0, . . . ,φk} = ⊘. If φn is a tautology over the
signature S, then T  φn and, in virtue of {φ0, . . . ,φk} =⊘, R ¯D (φ0, . . . ,φn) = 0 for
every set of updates ¯D over the S-database D = (A,T ). If φn is a tautology with at
least one symbol not in S, say that S′ is the signature of φn, then we cannot affirm
that T  φn because φn is not in the language of T . Nevertheless, it is impossible
to assert T 2 φn. Indeed, suppose that T 2 φn. Hence, there is an S∪ S′-structure
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B such that B is model of T and it is not a model of φn, but this an absurd: φn
is a tautology over S∪ S′ and for that reason B(φn) = 1. Therefore, if ¯D is a set
of updates over the S-database D = (A,T ) with some D satisfactory for φn, then
R
¯D
(φ0, . . . ,φn) = 0.
If is D-unacceptable, then there is not update D of D such that D(φn) = 1 and,
by definition, R
¯D
(φ0, . . . ,φn) = 0 for every set of updates ¯D over the S-database
D = (A,T ).
This result shows that deductions can be relevant only when we do not have a
complete theory of the structure of the database. Moreover, qua deductions, iso-
lated logical facts (tautologies and contradictions) have no relevance. Hence, infor-
mational relevancy is an inferential notion. This conclusion will be crucial in our
solution to Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox and Hintikka’s scandal of deduction.
5 Semantic informativity
Having at hand dynamic concepts of complexity and relevance, it seems reasonable
to state two statements. On the one hand, the more complex the propositions in
support of a deduction are the more informative the deduction is. On the other hand,
the more relevant the support of a deduction is the more information it provides.
Our definition of semantic informativity of deductions relies on that idea.
Definition 51 The semantic informativity I
¯D
(φ0, . . . ,φn) of a deduction φ0, . . . ,φn
in the set of updates ¯D over the database D is defined by
I
¯D
(φ0, . . . ,φn) =C ¯D (φ0, . . . ,φn)R ¯D(φ0, . . . ,φn).
Example 51 Let ¯D = {D ,D ′,D ′′}, where D , D ′ and D ′′ are the updates in
example 42. Then, I
¯D
(Ea,∃xEx) = 1 · 1 = 1 and I
¯D ′(∀x(Cx → ¬Ex),Cb,Cb →
¬Eb,¬Eb) = (2/3) ·4 = 8/3.
In other words, the semantic informativity of a deduction φ0, . . . ,φn is directly
proportional to the complexity and relevance of its propositions. This standpoint
permit us to conceive the semantic informativity of a proposition as a special case
of the semantic informativity of deductions. What is more, we can prove that the
semantic informativity of a proposition is its informational complexity.
Theorem 51 For every collection of updates ¯D over an S-database D, I
¯D
(φ) =
C
¯D
(φ).
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Proof Let ¯D be a collection of updates over an S-database D = (A,T ). By def-
inition, C
¯D
({φ}) = C
¯D
(φ). If C
¯D
(φ) = 0, then I
¯D
(φ) = R
¯D
(φ)C
¯D
(φ) = 0. If
C
¯D
(φ) > 0, then there is an update D ∈ ¯D such that D(φ) = 1 but A(φ) = 0.
Let us suppose that this D is the least one for which D(φ) = 1. In this case, as A is
a model of T , it should be that T 2 φ . Therefore, R
¯D
({φ}) = 1, which means that
I
¯D
(φ) =C
¯D
(φ).
Example 52 Let ¯D = {D ,D ′,D ′′}, where D , D ′ and D ′′ are the updates in ex-
ample 42. We have that I
¯D
(Ea) = I
¯D
(∃xEx) = I
¯D
(Ea → ∃xEx) = 0, despite the
fact that I
¯D
(Ea,∃xEx) = 1. Similarly, we also have that I
¯D
(∀x(Cx →¬Ex)) = 0,
I
¯D
(Cb) = 0, I
¯D
(¬Eb) = 4, I
¯D
((∀x(Cx → ¬Ex)∧Cb∧Cb →¬Eb)→ ¬Eb) = 0,
although I
¯D
(∀x(Cx →¬Ex),Cb,Cb →¬Eb,¬Eb) = 8/3.
Theorem 51 shows that semantic informativity of propositions is a measure
of semantic information in Floridi’s sense [Floridi(2004)]. It measures how many
structural operations we do in order to obtain the semantic information of a propo-
sition. For this reason, in example 52 we have that I
¯D
(Cb) = 0: false well-formed
data is not semantically informative; it should be true in our database. In contrast
to Floridi, in our approach not all true well-defined data is informative. In example
52, I
¯D
(∀x(Cx → ¬Ex)) = 0, but ∀x(Cx → ¬Ex) is true in the original update D.
Furthermore, the realistic or anti-realistic nature of semantic information is out of
question, for the propositions in our database may not be true in world. Differently
from Floridi’s theory, our theory of semantic informativity is strictly logical.
Since the notion of semantic informativity that we have proposed is logi-
cal, there is one more important distinction with respect to other recent the-
ories of semantic information - not only with respect to Floridi’s theory but
also to [Sequoiah-Grayson(2009),Jago(2009),D’Alfonso(2011)]. Given a deduc-
tion φ0, . . . ,φn and a set of updates ¯D over D, if we have C ¯D(φ0, . . . ,φn) = 0 or
R
¯D
(φ0, . . . ,φn) = 0, then the semantic informativity of φ0, . . . ,φn is zero, it does not
matter how φ0, . . . ,φn is. Now, if C ¯D(φn) = 0, then, by definition, R ¯D(φ0, . . . ,φn) =
0. In other words, if our database is D and we intend to evaluate I
¯D
(φ0, . . . ,φn) in
some set of updates ¯D over D, we should look for a D in ¯D satisfactory for φn,
i.e., a D for which CD (φn) > 0. Therefore, due to our notion of informational rel-
evancy, the analysis of semantic informativity is also oriented to the conclusion of
deductions. Theorem 51 is a consequence of that inferential orientation.
In [Floridi(2008)], Floridi already analyzed the relation between epistemic rele-
vancy and semantic information, but he did not conceive relevancy a component of
semantic informativity, as we have done here (Cf. [Allo(2014)]). In [Mares(2009)],
it was proposed to study informativity in relevant logics, but our concept of rele-
vancy is not connected with non-classical logics. It is actually very far from the one
used in relevant logics, for us a proposition can be relevant despite it is not used
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to obtain a conclusion - what is quite opposite to relevant logics. Our theory is a
hegelian conception about semantic information. It analyzes semantic informativ-
ity in semantic-inferential terms, like Brandom [Brandom(1989)] did with respect
to linguistic meaning. Whereas Floridi’s conception is kantian, in the sense that it
analyzes the relationship between propositions and the world in order to understand
the conditions for semantic information.
Given that changes in the strong conception about semantic information, we
can, first, solve Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox.
Theorem 52 For some collections of updates ¯D over an S-database D, there are
tautologies φ such that I
¯D
(φ) = 0 but there are tautologies ψ such that I
¯D
(ψ)> 0.
In contrast, for every collection of updates ¯D over an S-database D and every
contradiction φ , I
¯D
(φ) = 0.
Proof By theorem 51, I
¯D
(φ) = C
¯D
(φ) for every collection of updates ¯D over an
S-database D. Thus, we only need to apply lemma 31.
Theorem 52 is a solution to Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox: tautologies are, in gen-
eral, uninformative and contradictions are always without information. This is a
consequence of the veridicality thesis associated to the strong conception of se-
mantic information: φ qualifies as semantic information only if φ is true (Cf.
[Floridi(2011)]). The fact that some tautologies can be informative is a conse-
quence of the veridicality thesis plus a complexity thesis: φ qualifies as semantic
information only if φ is complex. In the present paper, the complexity of some
tautologies is associated to have new symbols. We can qualify even more the in-
formativity of tautologies, but we will delegate that for future works. By now, we
want to conclude with a strong solution to Hintikka’s scandal of deduction.
Theorem 53 For every collection of updates ¯D over an S-database D and valid
deduction φ0, . . . ,φn over S with support {φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn}, if φ0, . . . ,φn is over S,
then I
¯D
((φ0 ∧ ·· · ∧ φk)→ φn) = 0 but not necessarily I ¯D({φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn}) = 0.
Moreover, if φ0, . . . ,φn has symbols not in S, there are collections of updates ¯D
over D for which I
¯D
((φ0∧·· ·∧φk)→ φn)> 0.
Proof Let D be an S-database. Since {φ0, . . . ,φk}{φn} is the support of a valid
deduction, (φ0∧·· ·∧φk)→ φn is a tautology. Then, by theorem 51, I ¯D((φ0 ∧·· ·∧
φk)→ φn) = C ¯D((φ0 ∧ ·· · ∧ φk)→ φn). Applying lemma 31, we have that either
I
¯D
((φ0∧·· ·∧φk)→ φn) = 0 or I ¯D((φ0∧·· · ∧φk)→ φn)> 0 according (φ0∧·· ·∧
φk)→ φn has or not only symbols in the signature S. In any case, by lemma 41,
I
¯D
({φ1, . . . ,φk}{φn})> 0 if for some D ∈ ¯D we have that D(φn) = 1 and at least
one φ ∈ {φ1, . . . ,φk}, A(φ) = 0, D(φ) = 1 and T 2 φ . Indeed, as D(φ) = 1 and
T 2 φ , we have that T is not a complete theory of A. Since φ ∈ {φ1, . . . ,φk}, we
know that {φ0, . . . ,φk} 6=⊘. Finally, because D(φn) = 1, φn is D-acceptable.
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This theorem is our strong solution to the scandal of deduction. It is strong
because it shows not only that some of the premisses of the scandal are false. It
demonstrates that we can have informative deductions, notwithstanding the unin-
formativity of their associated conditionals. In other words, as Hintikka wanted
to show, the conclusion of the scandal of deduction is false: there are informative
deductions. This is, in turn, a consequence of the veridicality and complexity the-
ses plus an inferential thesis: φ0, . . . ,φn qualifies as semantic information only if
φ0, . . . ,φn is relevant.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a way of measuring the semantic informativity of deductions
by means of dynamic concepts of informational complexity and relevancy. In an
schematic form, we can express our approach in the following way:
Semantic informativity = Complexity × Relevancy.
With respect to finite databases, we showed, first, how some tautologies can
be informative but contradictions cannot. This is our solution to Bar-Hillel-Carnap
paradox. It relies on two thesis: veridicality and complexity of semantic informa-
tion. Adding one more thesis, inferentiality, we also obtained a solution to Hin-
tikka’ scandal of deductions: some deductions can be informative and others not.
These three theses are part of the schematic form above.
As we have tried to make clear in the previous sections, this reformulation
of Floridi’s strong theory of semantic information poses some challenges to the
veridicality thesis, but it does not invalidate it. In fact, the core is the veridicality
thesis, which in some way characterize the left term of the schematic form above.
What we have proposed in this paper is that we can measure the left term using the
two terms of the right side of the equality above.
Given the work done here, we think there is a lot of future works to be done.
In [Arau´jo(2014)], we showed some consequences for artificial intelligence of the
quantitative approach to semantic information developed in this paper, but there is
other important directions to be explored. For applications, we can, for instance,
to define databases in terms of typed constructive structures, and so to analyze the
semantic information processing in some functional programming language, as it
was made in [Primiero(2013)] with respect to data errors. Moreover, with respect to
the foundations of the strong theory of semantic information, it would be desirable,
for example, to implement levels of abstraction into databases. In this way, we
will be able to evaluate Floridi’s theses about the epistemic status of the levels
of abstraction for semantic information. This is just to mention some important
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possible developments - the reader will find some other directions of research in
[Arau´jo(2014)].
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